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Sami PIHLSTRÖM & Henrik RYDENFELT, “Pragmatist Perspectives,” Acta Philosophica Fennica
86, The Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki, 2009
1 The  present  volume  is  a  collection  of  the  papers  presented  at  the  First  Nordic
Pragmatism Conference,  Pragmatism in Science,  Religion,  and Politics,  organized in
Helsinki by the Nordic Pragmatism Network (nordprag.org), the Philosophical Society
of  Finland,  the  Department  of  Philosophy  at  the  University  of  Helsinki,  and  the
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, in June
2008.
2 The overall  picture  that  can be  drawn from reading the  book testifies  to  both the
richness  and  the  quality  of  the  second  wave  Scandinavian  scholarship.  As  Sami
Pihlström  proudly  points  out  in  his  opening  contribution  to  the  volume,  Nordic
Pragmatism is no longer just a provincial movement, but it is widely acknowledged as a
respected voice in the pragmatist debate, as is witnessed by the presence of several
foreign scholars (actually, almost half of the contributors work outside of Scandinavian
Universities).  Its  international  character  marks  a  strong  difference  between  the
contemporary interest in pragmatism and the early 20th century involvement in it,
which was a rather superficial and peripheral phenomenon, mainly concerned with the
reception of some themes of James’ pragmatist philosophy of religion. Thanks to the
rise  of  the  neopragmatist  movement,  pragmatism  has  progressively  expanded  to
become not only a subject matter of both theoretical and historical inquiry, but also a
conceptual  framework  shared  by  a  great  number  of  philosophers  with  different
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interests and points of view. Accordingly, it might be held that the single distinctive
trait  of  Scandinavian  Pragmatism  amounts  to  the  conviction  that  pragmatism  is  a
philosophical perspective whose exploitation can be fruitful.
3 Therefore, the title Pragmatist Perspectives turns out to be a fit description of both the
Nordic Pragmatist Movement and of the present book. Pihlström observes that “at least
these key topics of pragmatist philosophy – social theory, communication, religion –
are well and alive in Scandinavia. Philosophy of science has not been forgotten […].
Also, dissertations and other works on Rorty’s radical neopragmatism have been and
are being written” (22). And this is precisely what can be found in the three sections
that constitute the volume. The first one, “Pragmatism, Early and Late,” collects essays
dealing with manifold topics, ranging from the relation between classical pragmatists
and  Hegel  (D. Anderson)  to  the  pragmatist  philosophy  of  technology  and  inquiry
(L. Hickman and Vuorio; Rydenfelt). Other essays are devoted to discussing pragmatic
naturalism (J. Shook), Rorty’s utopian political philosophy (A. Kremer), and the history
of Nordic pragmatism (S. Pihlström).
4 The  second  section  is  entitled  “Pragmatism,  Ethics,  and  Society,”  and  it  is  more
homogeneous than the first, revolving around the new conception of activity that was
endorsed by pragmatists. Whereas some contributions tackle the theoretical questions
of the nature of action and normativity (E. Kilpinen, E. Višovský) and of the distinction
between facts and values (I. Niiniluoto), practical issues are discussed at some length
too: the moral problem of whether it can be maintained that nature has some intrinsic
values (J. Welchman), the socio-pedagogical account of subjectivity provided by Dewey
and Mead (A. Sutinen, A. Gronow) and the idea of radical action (that is, “acting so as to
show opposition or hostility toward governmental or corporate plans and decisions,”
211)  in  Dewey’s  political  philosophy  (Ólafsson).  Strangely  enough,  there  is  no
contribution explicitly addressing the issues concerning the pragmatist philosophy of
psychology.
5 Finally,  the  third  section,  “Pragmatism  and  Religion,”  deals  with  the  pragmatist
approach to religious phenomena. As is well  known, from the very beginning of its
history  pragmatism has  been deeply  interested  in  the  philosophy  of  religion.  Both
Peirce and James believed that religious experience has to be taken into account by a
full-fledged pragmatist philosophy. In particular, William James’ version of pragmatism
has usually been read as a vindication of our religious beliefs. However, it seems much
more difficult to find a religious concern in the second-generation pragmatists (Dewey,
Mead, Tufts, and, partially, Santayana). The reason is that they gave a naturalistic turn
to pragmatism, so that they were much less interested in the relevance of religious
experiences  for  philosophy  than  they  were in  establishing  a  full-fledged  biological
theory of mental activity. One might even say that the possibility of accounting for
religious  phenomena  was  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  a  radical  naturalism.  The
contributors  of  the  present  volume  take  up  this  challenge  and  try  to  outline  a
naturalistic theory of religion, weighing its pros and cons. The section is composed of
an overview of pragmatists’  approach to religious questions (J. Campbell),  a  general
discussion concerning the availability of a religious reading of John Dewey’s A Common
Faith  (M. Eldridge),  and  a  radical  redescription  of  what  faith  is,  if  seen  from  a
naturalistic point of view (L. Bugaeva and J. Ryder). The two remaining contributions
are slightly different from the rest, lying on the margins of the pragmatic tradition.
The first one, whose authors are L. Haaparanta and H. J. Koskinen, proposes an analysis
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of religious belief, stressing that a correct analysis of it “should […] be able to function
as an instrument of self-understanding for the believer” (261). In brief, the main theses
of the essays are three: i) religious language is specifically different from the language
of science and common sense; “our epistemic route to the world of religion is built on
the  religious  practice”  (267);  “some  beliefs  that  a  religious  believer  holds  can  be
supported  by  arguments  inside  the  worldview”  (262).  The  second  one,  written  by
E. Herrmann, also endorses an internal realist  perspective on truth and reality and,
from this point of view, it discusses the clash so typical of the contemporary world
between  religion  and  the  sciences.  Since  truth  is  not  a  metaphysical  property  of
correspondence of ideas to reality, but a general feature of our practices of living in the
world, religion and science can both be true. “Science provides us with knowledge of
how  reality  offers  us  resistance  in  empirical  regards  […]. Religions  and  secular
ideologies provide us with rituals, images and narratives for conceptualizing […] what
is intellectually incomprehensible” (272).
6 Since it is obviously not possible – and it would not be even particularly useful – to give
a detailed account of every single essay, I prefer to highlight the two strains of thought
which  I  believe  are  most  worthy  of  attention,  because  of  their  relevance  to  the
contemporary debate: the pragmatist naturalism and the pragmatist theory of action.
Taken together, they supply a reliable view of what I  judge to be the most original
trends  happening  in  the  present  book  and,  insofar  as  it  can  be  taken  to  be
representative of the whole movement, in Scandinavian pragmatism as well. The two
aspects  are  deeply  interwoven,  because  the  general  theory  of  action  relies  on
metaphysics. For the sake of convenience, I will start discussing the latter, and then I
will come back to the latter.
7 Pragmatism is a philosophy of action. The pragmatic maxim asserts that to clarify the
meaning of a concept, one has to look for its conceivable practical bearings. In 1903, in
his Lowell Lectures, Peirce reformulated the maxim he proposed in “How to make our
ideas  clear”  in  order  to  make  it  easier  to  grasp  the  relation  between  activity  and
meaning. He subsequently declared that that “Pragmatism is the principle that every
theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused
form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a
corresponding  practical  maxim  expressible  as  a  conditional  sentence  having  its
apodosis in the imperative mood” (CP 5.18).
8 However, to claim that action lies at the very core of the pragmatist project is only a
half-truth. In his essay entitled “Pragmatism as a philosophy of action,” Kilpinen points
out that “to see this is not yet […] to see the essential pragmatist point; in what sense
they talk about action. Their usage of the term and the underlying idea differ from
what  is  customary  in  other  philosophical  approaches”  (163).  The  point  Kilpinen  is
trying to underline is that “action” has different meanings, according to the different
conceptual frameworks in whose terms the notion is defined. So, for instance, analytic
philosophers are used to considering actions as external (physical) manifestations of
previous internal (mental) resolutions. Their account of action, which Kilpinen calls the
“mind-first explanation of action” (164), is clearly dualistic: actions do not contribute
to the enhancement and clarification of the meaning of concepts (beliefs,  theory or
deliberations)  because,  according  to  this  approach,  the  latter  are  fully  complete  in
themselves before being tested in practice.  Action is  something which is  externally
added to a ready-made cognitive state: “an intention, plan, or decision first has to be
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formed  in  the  acting  subject’s  mind  and  […]  it  then  is  to  be  executed  in  concrete
doings” (164-5).
9 Pragmatists believe that this depiction of action is radically flawed. They charge the
mindirst  explanation of  action with relying on the  classic  mind/body dualism and,
consequently, with isolating the subject from the world and making it impossible to
understand “the way in which human beings exist in the world” (164). There are two
relevant  points  at  stake  here,  as  Kilpinen  rightly  notes.  The  first  one  is  that,  if
Darwinian evolutionism is to be taken seriously – as pragmatism was eager to do – the
subject  has  to  be  recognized  firstly  as  an  organism  that  strives  to  cope  with  his
environment.  Pragmatists  were well  aware of  the fact  that all  human knowledge is
acquired on the basis of action, without assuming any transcendental warrant for its
validity  (170).  It  follows  that  what  a  human being  is  (his  concepts,  his  beliefs,  his
character) can be determined only through his actions, whose proper aim is to bring
about the transformation of the external world into a comfortable dwelling-place. This
means that acting within the world turns out to be the very essence of human nature,
and it cannot be boiled down to a contingent and somewhat superficial manifestation
of something internal, considered as the true reality. The second point that deserves
attention  is  that  the  mind-first  explanation  entails  an  atomistic  view  of  action.
According to this perspective, action is always an individual action, upon which the
more  complicated  forms  of  behaviour  are  based.  Instead,  classic  pragmatists  were
deeply  interested  in  general  conduct,  since  “steady  behaviour  patterns  are  human
action’s natural mode of being” (175).
10 Accordingly,  the main proposal Kilpinen advances in his essay is a consideration of
pragmatism as a philosophy of habitual action. Now, especially as far as the English-
speaking philosophical world is concerned, Kilpinen states that “the habit-concept is
mostly traced to David Hume, who uses it interchangeably with the term ‘custom’,” so
that Hume’s account of habit as proceeding from a past repetition “might be called the
standard understanding of the habit-term” (171). However, pragmatists do not agree
with the Humean conception of habit as a “repetitive, self-propelling behavior”; rather,
their  aim  was  to  marry  “thought  and  habit  […]  together,”  in  order  to  “[situate]
intentionality inside the habitual dimension” (172). Pragmatists “do include reflection
into their habit-concept” (172), rejecting the conviction that habit can be boiled down
to a mere repetition of the past isolated actions.
11 Unfortunately,  Kilpinen  does  not  deal  extensively  with  the  conceptual  strategy
pragmatists  deploy  to  attain  this  goal  –  that  is,  the  goal  of  re-defining  reflection,
rationality and normativity in terms of habitual action. As he admits in the conclusion
of his contribution, he aims at providing an overview of pragmatists’ new theory of
human action, and, insofar as that was his goal, his essay meets it perfectly. Readers
who want to delve deeper into the matter are referred to Kilpinen’s book The Enormous
Fly Wheel  of  Society:  Pragmatism’s Habitual Conception of  Action and Social  Theory (2000).
However, there is one aspect of his argument that I do not find completely satisfactory.
It  concerns  the  relation  Kilpinen  draws  between  self-propelling  behaviour  and
rationality. It is not fully clear to me whether Kilpinen is arguing that habit as self-
propelling behaviour is  specifically different from habit “married with thought.” At
first glance, it seems evident that classic pragmatists maintained that only deliberately
formed  and  voluntary  habits  embody  rationality.  Thus,  Kilpinen  rightly  refers  to
Peirce’s  conception  of  habit  as  the  final  logical  interpretant  of  a  sign  to  provide
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evidence for his reading. However, even if it holds true for Peirce that the logically
meaningful habits are specifically different from mere repetitions of what has been
done  in  the  past,  it  does  not  follow  that  Peirce’s  insight,  whose  proper  field  of
application  was  intended  to  be  the  nature  of  logical  reasoning,  can  be  so  easily
extended  to  all  the  other  pragmatists,  who  were  deeply  committed  to  the  social
sciences and psychology rather than to logic. Kilpinen quotes a passage from Dewey’s
Human Nature and Conduct: “The reason why a baby can know little and an experienced
adult know much when confronting the same things is not because the latter has a
‘mind’ which the former has not, but because one has already formed habits which the
other has still to acquire” (J. Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 14: 1922. Human
Nature and Conduct, 128). This quotation can be read in two different ways. It is possible
to focus the attention on the notion of an experienced adult, stating that an adult is
experienced  only  when  his  habits  are  deliberately  formed.  This  interpretation  is
plausible and it seems to grasp Dewey’s intention. Indeed, the previous quotation goes
on to say: “The scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter, the physician and
politician know with their habits not with their ‘consciousness’” (ibid.). Their habits are
reliable because i) they have acquired them through education and ii) they constantly
subject them to criticism. However, this conclusion is somewhat counterintuitive: it is
apparent that every adult knows much more than a child when confronting the same
things, regardless of his being well educated or not. Take, for instance, the common
sense concept of a table: is it really plausible to hold that we need conscious reflection
to acquire a certain habit of behaving toward tables? Does it  make any sense? It  is
probably much more plausible to assume that, having entertained some relations with
tables in previous experiences,  we formed habits of behaviour which constitute the
meaning we attribute to all the objects encountered in our experience which are table-
like.  Thus,  it  seems  that,  when  our  most  basic  habits  of  behaviour  are  taken  into
account,  we  are  compelled  to  admit  that  the  Humean conception  of  habit  may  be
enough to explain a large part of our active beingness in the world, provided that we
assume that human beings are not mentally collecting passive impressions from the
world, but experimenters who actively interact with their environment.
12 From Kilpinen’s article it is possible to draw the conclusion that pragmatists’ practical
turn entails a radical re-description of both norms and normativity in terms of habits
of  behaviour.  Višovský  deals  extensively  with  this  issue  in  his  contribution,  “A
pragmatist approach to Norms and Normativity.” This essay is particularly interesting
for  two very  different  reasons.  Firstly,  it  witnesses  the  difficulties  that  are  met  in
defining what  the  pragmatist  account  of  normativity  amounts  to.  These  difficulties
stem in large part from the fact that pragmatists do not share the same language with
other more influential contemporary philosophical traditions. This holds true not only
for those concepts through which a theory of action is attained, as Kilpinen pointed
out,  but  also  for  the  concepts  which  give  rise  to  a  sound  pragmatist  theory  of
normativity.  Višovský enumerates four aspects that provide a good insight into the
nature of normativity: “1. Norms are standards (or criteria), 2. norms are prescriptions
(including proscriptions), 3. norms involve expectations, 4. norms involve sanction.”
These  are  rightly  said  to  be  “fully  compatible  with  pragmatism  […]  providing  the
opportunity  for  their  theoretical  development  within  the  pragmatist  framework”
(138). He then advances two distinctions that he judges useful for a right formulation of
the issue of normativity. On the one hand, Višovský states that “‘normative’ has been
identified  with  behavior  according  to  rules;  and  norms  as  such  have  also  been
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identified with rules. However norms and rules can and should be differentiated.” On
the other hand, he maintains that “there is a long tradition, which conceptually does
not differentiate between norms and values in particular […]. Norms and values are not
identical; these are different phenomena.” Now, I think that Višovský takes needless
risks in introducing into his analysis of the pragmatist conception of normativity these
categories,  which  do  not  belong  to  the  pragmatist  tradition.  For  instance,  his
distinction between normativity and value, which is drawn from Habermas, seems to be
somewhat at odds with pragmatist theory. Višovský writes that “[w]hereas i) norms are
rather concrete and values are abstract;  ii)  norms are real and values are ideal;  iii)
norms are means and values are ends” (139). While the third point is undoubtedly true,
and the second is very plausibly true, the first one is inaccurate. Višovský relies deeply
on Dewey’s analysis of norms and criteria. Now, at least in one sense, Dewey strongly
denies that norms are real and values are ideal. Since Dewey is a particularist both in
ethics and in epistemology, he holds that the values are real because they are concrete
states of the world that the agent strives to attain. And at the same time, he maintains
that the norms are ideal in the sense that they are general modes of behaviour. So, it
can  be  argued  that  the  conceptual  framework  according  to  which  contemporary
philosophy  deals  with  normativity  does  not  fit  within  the  categories  endorsed  by
pragmatists. Anyway, the point I want to raise is not that the only admissible approach
to pragmatism is  the historical  one.  Rather,  I  would like to stress the fact that the
pragmatist revival announced by the very title of the volume – Pragmatist Perspectives –
cannot overlook the distance (both theoretical and historical) that separates classical
pragmatism from contemporary philosophical approaches.
13 The second aspect of Višovský’s essay that deserves particular attention consists in its
valuable  sketch of  a  viable  “pragmatist  approach to  normativity  and norms” (141).
Unlike Kilpinen, who is interested in providing a general theory of action, Višovský’s
main concern is that level of normativity that manifests itself in the complex fields of
ethics and politics. The change of focus is relevant because it restricts the discussion to
a limited set of specific problems. There is obviously a strong continuity between what
can be called a ground level of normativity (corresponding to the acquisition of basic
common-sense concepts) and the more refined normative dimension lying at the core
of the transactions amongst human beings. However, ethical norms display peculiar
properties that arise from the facts of associate life, and cannot be reduced to those
simpler forms of interaction holding between man and his environment. Višovský lays
stress on the fact that these peculiar properties revolve primarily around the problem
of  authority  and the  source  of  normativity.  Discussing  John Dewey’s  conception  of
conformity, Višovský observes that the mere obedience to authority is not enough to
make  conformity  to  social  norms  ethical,  since  authority  may  rely  exclusively  on
violence or on mistaken customary codes of duties. At the same time, this does not
amount to proposing a “kind of ‘normlessness’ or subjectivism” (142). On the contrary,
the pragmatic solution to the problem of normativity consists in “the education of a
self-independent and creative person” (143), that is, in the formation and enhancement
of those habits of valuation that govern a truly reflective and thoughtful morality. But
what is the proper structure of a norm? To answer this question, Višovský refers to
F. L. Will’s essay “Philosophical Governance of Norms.” According to Will, norms are
active, alive and open to further revisions. Norms are not to be conceived of as fixed
schemes that mechanically determine the action or thought to be performed. Norms
evolve,  undergo  alterations,  since  they  “are  themselves  determined,  not  only
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determining, by the spheres of life they inform” (143). Višovský is undoubtedly right
when  he  states  that  “[n]orms  should  not  be  taken  as  sacrosanct  structures,
insusceptible  to  revision”;  rather,  “[t]he  crucial  process  is  the  process  of  devising
(including revising) norms” (143-4). The process of revision of normativity highlights
the  instrumental  nature  of  the  norms  and  rules  embedded  in  practice.  “Norms  as
criteria of selections are tools and instruments. Norms are just our human tools and
instruments for deciding and acting” (145). This instrumental account of normativity
has  two  relevant  consequences.  Firstly,  it  entails  the  rejection  of  the  project  of
founding normativity on human reason, understood as a separate and a priori faculty.
Pragmatism brings all the concepts, norms, and criteria that form the individual’s mind
down to the earth. As Višovský notices, the source of normativity is “social practice and
reason embedded in  it,  that  is,  social  intelligence”  (146).  Secondly,  the  community
turns out to be not only the sole and ultimate source of normativity, but also the locus
wherein actions guided by norms take place. Referring to Singer’s notion of “normative
community,” Višovský states that “[t]he existence of norms and normative community
is the prerequisite of human life as we know it” (144). Through norms, an individual
enters  into  relation  with  the  other  persons  who  belong  to  the  same  normative
community. In more pragmatist terms, that means that norms provide useful tools to
enlarge action. Norms influence action because i) “they enable mutual identification,
understanding the responses of others, and social cohesion” (144); ii) they require an
active participation of individuals in the process of perpetuation and revision of the
normative  stance.  Finally,  since  human  beings  belong  to  a  normative  community
independently from their will, the mandatory character of normativity is preserved.
Thus, the very idea of a normative community entails both the possibility of sanctions
of deviant behaviour and the responsabilist assumption according to which the overall
quality of a normative community depends on the quality of its members.
14 In summary, the pragmatist theory of action and normativity, as it emerges from the
contributions  written  by  Kilpinen  and  Višovský,  centres  on  four  theses:  i)  human
beings  are  agents;  ii)  pragmatists  define  action in  terms of  habit  of  conduct;  iii)  a
pragmatist  theory of  action involves a re-description of  the concepts of  norms and
normativity in terms of habitual action; iv) normativity is the consequence and the
condition  of  possibility  of  associate  life.  However,  the  following  question  remains
unanswered: why are human beings to be conceived of primarily as agents? Why do
pragmatists  hold  that  the  classical  interpretation  of  human  beings  as  knowers  is
flawed? As Kilpinen notices, the reason “is not immanently epistemological. It rather is
ontological”  (166).  Human beings are agents  rather than bare knowers because the
world in which they live is not a static world which can be grasped by perception and
by  reasoning,  as  classic  philosophers  believed,  but  a  process-world  which  becomes
meaningful only when agents transform it accordingly to their needs and desires. The
second  generation  pragmatists  used  the  term  “nature”  to  refer  to  this  process  of
coming to life and the continuous change of things in the world, and they adopted the
term “naturalism” to  indicate  the  general  philosophical  theory  according  to  which
there is nothing outside nature – the metaphysical conviction that what is real is what
is natural.
15 In  his  essay  entitled  “Pragmatic  Naturalism,”  Shook  deals  with  the  contemporary
relevance of a pragmatist approach to naturalism and, at the same time, he provides a
convincing reconstruction of the historical debates through which pragmatism forged
its  conceptual  tools.  Naturalism  is  a  strong  paradigm  of  inquiry,  spanning  from
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epistemology to ethics and consisting in “the reduction of reality to objects of science
and the elimination of anything that resists scientific reduction” (97). At the same time,
contemporary  philosophers  like  McDowell,  Putnam  and  Stroud  advocate  a  revised
version of the naturalistic program, which is usually called liberal naturalism, whose
aim is  to  recognize  the  importance of  science  and,  at  the  same time,  to  resist  the
reductionist  temptation  of  denying  reality  to  the  common  sense  concepts.  Shook’s
thesis  is  that  what  he  calls  pragmatic  naturalism  is  closer  to  the  revised  form  of
naturalism than to the stronger naturalistic project.  The main feature of pragmatic
naturalism  is  the  “combination  of  empiricism  and  realism  that  takes  scientific
knowledge very seriously” (91). To take scientific knowledge seriously does not mean,
however,  that  science is  the ultimate test  of  validity of  every possible  concept and
belief. Rather, it implies the recognition that science has an effective and specific role
in  human experience.  Shook  exposes  the  pivotal  thesis  of  pragmatic  naturalism as
follows:  “experience  has  a  greater  extent  than  scientific  knowledge”  (98),  so  that
“[a]ppreciation  for  the  many  vital  and  practical  relationships  and  interpretations
among  experiences  and  scientific  knowledge  inspires  the  Perspectival  Pluralism  to
postulate  one  natural  world  which  experience  and  science  both  reveal”  (106).
Perspectival  pluralism  is  one  of  the  six  features  which,  according  to  Shook,
characterized pragmatic naturalism. Besides this, it is an empiricism that is i) critical,
insofar as it assumes that even our more sophisticated modes of inference originate in
experience  (p.  92),  and  prospective,  since  it  is  “focused  on  the  acquisition  of  new
knowledge  rather  than the  systematization  of  already  established  knowledge”  (95).
Moreover, it is an empirical naturalism, which maintains that human experience is not
a veil separating the subject from reality, but the path through which the secrets of
nature can be revealed. Finally, it is a realism that is both abductive and pragmatic.
Shook wants to stress the fact that through abduction, some entities are postulated to
explain the pattern of events. The postulated entities are naturally taken as real objects
of the world by scientists. However, since some of those entities are unobservable, it
seems possible to cast doubt on their reality. Antirealists in the philosophy of science
hold that “we should not think that the unobservable entities postulated by highly
confirmed hypothesis really do exist” (101). Pragmatic realism is a via media between a
strong realism towards the existence of objects postulated by sciences and a strong
version of instrumentalism. It revolves around the idea that “sufficient experimental
success of a model warrants a degree of ontological confidence in the entities described
by that model” (104), where an entity is completely defined in terms of the laws that
govern its behaviour. In other words, scientific objects are the laws they exhibit.
16 Shook’s pragmatic naturalism sets both the language and the agenda of a large part of
the contemporary pragmatist movement. In the light of it much of the issues dealt with
in  the  volume  get  their  proper  meaning  and  import.  So,  for  instance,  Hickman’s
insistence on technology,  that  is,  the  conception that  ideas  are  tools  forged in  the
process  of  inquiry,  explains  how  human  beings  can  attain  a  logical  point  of  view,
notwithstanding their being parts of nature. The same holds true for the effort made by
Bugaeva  and Ryder  in  their  “Naturalism and Religion”  to  understand the  practical
meaning of  religious beliefs.  Referring to  the naturalistic  temptation to  deny God’s
existence, Bugaeva and Rdyer state: “[i]t is precisely here that the naturalist has to be
careful: the  power  and  the  significance  of  the  belief  in  God  is  a  dimension  of  the
phenomenon that is to be accounted for on natural terms” (238). Since naturalism rules
out the hypothesis that God exists outside nature, a pragmatist account of religious
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phenomena is compelled to find a plausible way of conveying traditional belief in an
omniscient and omnipotent God in a naturalistic fashion.
17 These last remarks are particularly interesting, since it is possible to draw from them a
general  conclusion about  what  I  think  is  the  most  relevant  feature  of  most  of  the
contributions collected in this volume. Naturalism was not endorsed by all the classic
pragmatists. For instance, Peirce strongly criticized Dewey’s project of a naturalistic
account of  logic,  and even James was much less  satisfied with a strong naturalistic
paradigm than Dewey was. Thus, it seems to me that the present book witnesses that,
by assuming naturalism as its proper paradigm of inquiry and trying to develop a socio-
naturalistic account of action, the pragmatist debate is progressively shifting from the
discussion  of  themes  drawn  from  Peirce  and  James  to  a  critical  analysis  of  issues
belonging  to  the  second  generation  pragmatists,  such  as  Dewey, Mead,  Tufts,  and
Santayana. If my interpretation is correct, then the present volume actually keeps its
word; it points to some new Pragmatist Perspectives, that is, to some new lines of inquiry
which might change our inherited image of pragmatism.
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